








Causal Theories of Intentionality
This entry surveys a range of proposed solutions to the problem of intentionality, that is, the problem of explaining how human thoughts can be about, or be directed toward, objects. The family of solutions described here takes the content of a mental representation—what that concept represents or is about—to be a function of causal relations between mental representations and their typically external objects. This emphasis on causal relations should be understood broadly, however, so as to cover theories couched in terms of law-like natural relations or the law-governed way in which one natural event carries information about another.
I. The problem of intentionality
For good reason, the aboutness of human thought seems mysterious, especially to those who embrace the contemporary scientific view of the universe. When a human thinks about her next meal, something in the human’s mind represents food or takes food as its object. In contrast, consider the physical relation of being next to. The filing cabinet might be next to the desk, but it is not about the desk; it is not directed at the desk, it does not mean the desk, and it does not take the desk as an object. What in the physical world grounds the aboutness of concepts and mental states?
	Causal relations may be the answer. Causes and effects permeate the universe, though, and intentionality does not. Thus, a causal theory of intentionality must identify the particular form or pattern of causal relations that determines the intentional relation.
II. Laws and information
A. Asymmetric dependence
In the human case, mental representations most likely take physical form in the neural system, and of course these neural structures participate in the natural order of causes and effects. This suggests a straightforward causal account of intentional content: a mental representation is about whatever causes its activation (where activation might amount to increased rates of neural firings). For instance, when one sees a cow, this activates the collection of neurons heightened firing of which constitutes the activation of a mental representation -- the representation of cows. 
	We should, however, want to identify a persisting representation of cows, one that can be activated in a variety of contexts, on each occasion serving as a vehicle for the subject's thoughts about cows. This desideratum introduces a complication. We should want standing representations partly because humans often think about cows in the absence of cows, that is, even when a cow has not, on the occasion of the subject's thought, directly caused the activation of any of her mental representations. This is especially clear in cases of misrepresentation, in which something other than a cow -- say, a horse in the fog -- causes a subject to think about cows, because, as we would normally put it, she has mistaken the horse for a cow. Thus, we require a more discerning causal theory, one that does not simply identify the intentional content of a mental representation with whatever causes its activation. For the simple theory does not seem to allow for misrepresentation; rather it entails that any cause of the activation of a given mental representation is correctly characterized by the intentional content of that representation.
	In response to such concerns, Jerry Fodor develops his asymmetric dependence account of intentional content. The fundamental idea is that, relative to the activation of some particular mental representation, certain law-like processes are derivative on others. There are standard ways in which the activation of a mental representation can be caused, and there are nonstandard ways. Moreover, the former have their status precisely because the other processes depend asymmetrically on them: were the standard channels not in place, the nonstandard channels would not be either, but not vice versa. The nonderivative law-based relations that cause the activation of a mental representation thus determine its intentional content. A concept represents whatever it is nomically linked to (i.e., linked to by laws of nature) and is such that its nomic link to the concept is the one on which all other such links depend.
	Consider a case in which visual input caused by a horse eventuates in the activation of what we normally consider the subject’s mental representation of a cow. According to the asymmetric dependence theory, the mental representation in question would not be activated if it were not the sort of thing activations of which can be caused in a law-like way by cows. The converse, however, is not true: if the concept in question were to lose entirely its sensitivity to horses, its activation would still be caused by cows. Thus, it represents cows, not horses.
B. Informational semantics
Alternatively, a mental representation’s intentional content might be the information it carries about some source; that is, the mental representation may simply be about whatever state of the source the mental representation carries information about. 
	Begin with the notion of the amount of information carried. On a specific occasion when a signal is transmitted, the transmitting source is in one of its possible states; so, too, is the device receiving that signal, and this latter state—the state of the receiver—may reveal more or less about the state of the source. If the state of the receiver is consistent with a wide variety of states of the source, then the state of the receiver carries less information about the source than if the state of the receiver had been consistent with only one or two states of the source. As an illustration, consider a case in which an English speaker passes a one-word note to another English speaker. The end of the word is illegible; all that can be made out is ‘pe’, with a smudge following it. The resulting state of the receiver—the visual apparatus of the person reading the note—is consistent with a substantial range of English words: ‘pet’, ‘pen’, ‘percolate’, ‘pedestrian’, and many more. Thus, the state of the receiver does not pinpoint the state of mind of the person who wrote the note. In contrast, if the note had shown the letters ‘perenniall’ followed by a smudge, the state of the receiver would have carried as much information as possible in this situation; for it rules out all possibilities except that the person writing the note had ‘perennially’ in mind (assuming in this case that the domain of states of the source is limited to thoughts about English words).
	The informational approach need not focus only on quantity of information, though. A simple informational theory might hold that the receiver state is specifically about whatever state of the source it homes in on, that is, whatever state (or possible range of states) the source must be in, given the state of the receiver. 
	Our earlier problem about misrepresentation recurs, however. Whatever the state of the external source, it is thereby among those with which the state of the receiver is consistent! Fred Dretske once proposed to handle this problem by positing a period during which the intentional content of a mental representation is established (and which is then retained by future activations of the mental representation in question). If, during the learning period, a mental representation carries information about only one property or kind, the mental representation is thereafter about that one property or kind. In contrast, if, during the learning period, the mental representation carries less definite information (its activation is consistent with the presence of more than one possible state of the world), then the mental representation is thereafter about the relevant range of possibilities. Once the learning period ends, the mental representation can be misapplied, thus allowing—as a theory of intentional content should—for misrepresentation.
III. Causal History
A. Information and learning history
Many causal theories take the subject’s history to determine the intentional content of at least some of her mental representations. Seeing the shortcomings of the idea of a learning period, Fred Dretske later focused on changes that take place during the learning process itself. Think of an information-bearing structure as a mere detector: when it lights up, it has detected the presence of whatever’s presence is guaranteed by that structure’s lighting up. Such indication can, in some circumstances, provide a reward for the subject. In these cases, behavioral success reinforces the connection between the information-bearing structure in question and the reward-engendering action it caused. As a result, a structure can acquire a function within the subject’s cognitive system—the function of producing the kind of behavior in question. The intentional content of said structure, then, is whatever (a) the structure indicated on the occasion of its acquiring a new function in the cognitive system and (b) is such that the structure’s indicating it explains this modification. Even just one instance of form of behavior can be rewarded, with reinforcement as a result: the mental representation the activation of which caused the subject to exhibit said behavior can now be tightly associated with that form of behavior. Moreover, when this occurs, it can occur because what the activated mental representation carried information about (what it indicated) helps to explain the success of the subject's behavior on that occasion.
	On this view, misrepresentation occurs when a mental representation is applied to something other than that the indication of which explains why the mental representation acquired its role in the cognitive system. Assume, for example, that a neurological structure indicates warmth and, via reinforcement, comes to control, say, certain bodily movements. Developmentally early cases might involve, for instance, the warmth of a parent's body. Moving toward that warmth rewards the infant or young child by satisfying a desire for, say, human contact; moreover, it does so precisely because that contact comes from the source of warmth. If, at a later time, this mental representation is activated, the child thinks about warmth, regardless of whether, on these further occasions, the representation indicates the presence of something warm or whether moving toward something warm results in a reward.
B. The Best Test Theory
Robert Rupert's historically oriented proposal emphasizes comparative probabilistic relations, at least for those representations emerging early in development. The fundamental idea is that a mental representation is about whatever kind or property is the most efficient cause of that mental representation. The efficiency of a cause is measured in the following way. Take a mental representation. For each property or kind of thing that has caused the activation of that mental representation, ask the following: Of all of the mental structures members of that kind (or instances of that property) have activated in a given subject, what proportion were cases of the representation in question? In this fashion, we can ask, relative to a single mental representation (in a single subject), which property or kind is most efficient in its causing of that mental representation relative to its causing of other mental representations. This approach is thus doubly comparative. First, relative to a given mental representation, each kind (or property) has an efficiency rate, which is comparative in the way that relative frequencies are. That is to say, a single kind’s efficiency rate is determined by dividing the number of times it has caused any mental representation at all into the number of times it has caused the activation of the mental representation in question. So, its efficiency rate involves facts concerning only the way in which it has caused activation of the mental representation in question relative to its causing of the activation of other mental representations. Second, having in hand an efficiency rate for each kind or property relative to the single mental representation of interest, relations among these efficiency rates determine the intentional content of the mental representation in question: the mental representation is about the kind or property with the highest efficient rate relative to that mental representation.
	Consider a typical subject. Sometimes (on dark nights, for example), cows cause the activation of the representation we would take to be the subject’s horse-concept; but the efficiency rate of cows relative to that concept is, presumably, very low; of all the times cows have caused the activation of a concept in the subject, the proportion of those that were horse-concepts is very low. In contrast, most of the time horses have caused the activation of any mental representation at all, it has been the horse-concept, at least for the typical subject. So, relative to the horse-concept, horses are the winners.
IV. Isomorphism and teleology
Isomorphism-based views focus on the relation between the internal structure of a mental representation and the internal structure of what it represents: for a mental representation to be about some structure in the world, relations between the elements of the mental representation must mirror the relations between the elements in the thing represented. Moreover, on the explicitly causal version of this view, proposed by Dennis Stampe, a representation’s having its particular internal structure must have been caused by the analogous structure in the thing represented. Compare: the elements of a photograph relate to each other in the same way that the elements of the photographed scene relate to each other at the time the photograph was taken.
	There is, however, a surfeit of structure in the universe, which leads to a kind of indeterminacy. It may be that, at many steps in the causal chain leading to the activation of a mental representation, there appears an appropriate structure—one to which the structure of the representation is isomorphic. Which of the things (external object, structured light, patterns of upstream neural firings) is the object of the mental representation? To solve this problem, isomorphism-based theories typically defer to facts about the purpose or function of various components of the cognitive system—for instance, the visual system’s function of tracking objects in the environment. 
	Many causal theories of intentionality appeal to such teleological considerations in order to resolve indeterminacies or to inform the choice of an intentionality-determining causal relation. Biological theories of intentional contents, so-called teleosemantics, place teleology at center stage. Independent of questions about isomorphism, the general idea is this: the current content of a mental representation is whatever was correlated historically with activations of that kind of mental representation, but only in cases in which such correlation explains (e.g., evolutionarily) why mental representations of that type continued to be reproduced (see the work of Ruth Millikan and David Papineau).
V. Intentional systems
	The theories discussed above assign specific intentional contents to particular mental representations. Perhaps, however, a mental representation has intentional properties only if it appears within a suitable kind of system. For example, it may be that only a system of structures capable of producing intelligent behavior contains elements with intentional content. If there are such further conditions on intentionality, the approaches reviewed in the preceding sections are incomplete; for no physical structure represents simply on account of its satisfying, say, the asymmetric dependence condition. Instead, a structure with intentional content must also appear as part of system with the requisite characteristics.
								Robert Douglas Rupert
See also Atomism about Concepts; Biological Theories of Intentionality; Classical Theories of Concepts; Content of Thought; Representational Theory of the Mind.
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